Plato’s Dialogues Of Definition: Causal And Conceptual Investigations

Description

In each of Plato’s “dialogues of definition” (Euthyphro, Laches, Meno, Charmides, Lysis, Republic I, Hippias Major), Socrates motivates philosophical discussion by posing a question of the form “What is F-ness?” Yet these dialogues are notorious for coming up empty. Socrates’ interlocutors repeatedly fail to deliver satisfactory answers. Thus, the dialogues of definition are often considered negative— empty of any positive philosophical content. Justin C. Clark resists the negative reading, arguing that the dialogues of definition contain positive “Socratic” answers. In order to see the positive theory, however, one must recognize what Clark calls the "dual function" of the “What is F-ness?” question. Socrates is not looking for a single type of answer. Rather, Socrates is looking for two distinct types of answers. The “What is F-ness?” question serves as a springboard for two types of investigation— conceptual and causal. The key to understanding any of the dialogues of definition, therefore, is to decipher between them. Clark offers a way to do just that, at once resolving interpretive issues in Socratic philosophy, providing systematic interpretations of the negative endings, and generating important new readings of the Charmides and Lysis, whilst casting further doubt on the authenticity of the Hippias Major. Acknowledgements Contents Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Socrates’ Central Question 1.2 The Early Dialogues 1.3 The Elenchus 1.4 The Central Thesis 1.5 Chapter Overview References Chapter 2: The Dual-Function Thesis 2.1 Definition and the ‘What is F?’ Question 2.2 Kraut’s Theoretical Interpretation 2.3 Allen’s Metaphysical Interpretation 2.4 Causal and Conceptual Analysis 2.5 A Neutral Example 2.6 Examples from Socrates 2.7 The Conceptual Investigation 2.8 The Other Substitution 2.9 Meno’s Preference for Causal Answers 2.10 The Causal Investigation 2.11 The Second Half of the Meno 2.12 The Epistemic Priority of the Conceptual Investigation References Chapter 3: Socratic Inquiry and the Unity of the Virtues 3.1 The Interpretive Problem 3.2 The Penner-Vlastos Debate 3.3 The Devereux Discrepancy 3.4 The Key Passage in Protagoras 3.5 The Laches: A Causal Investigation 3.6 Virtues as Definitionally Distinct 3.7 Sub-Disciplines and Applications 3.8 The Metaphysical Interpretation Revisited 3.9 Two Lines of Investigation in Republic I and Republic II-X References Chapter 4: Socratic Epistemology and the Priority of Definition 4.1 The Interpretive Problem 4.2 Textual Evidence for (PD) 4.3 Socratic Epistemic Principles (P*) and (D*) 4.4 The Standard Interpretation References Chapter 5: Socratic Inquiry and the Aporetic Endings 5.1 The Epistemic Procedure 5.2 The Negative Endings 5.3 Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge 5.4 Socrates’ Causal Account 5.5 The Theoretical Interpretation Revisited References Chapter 6: Knowledge and Temperance in Plato’s Charmides 6.1 The Negative Ending 6.2 Promising Answers Concerning Temperance 6.3 Politis and the Positive Upshot 6.4 An Overview of the Dialogue and Its Definitions 6.5 Groundwork for a New Interpretation 6.6 Applying Knowledge of Good and Bad to the Soul 6.7 Conclusion References Chapter 7: Lysis and the Question of Friendship 7.1 The Negative Ending 7.2 Neutral Overview of the Lysis 7.3 The Aporetic Character of the Lysis 7.4 The Causal Investigation in Lysis 7.5 Two Poles of Interpretation 7.6 The Positive Upshot of the Lysis Part I: The First Friend Part II: The Oikeion References Chapter 8: The Authorship of the Hippias Major 8.1 Overview of the Dialogue and Its Definitions 8.2 Did Plato Write the Hippias Major? 8.3 Dual-Function Evidence 8.4 Violation of Rules in Hippias Major 8.5 Three Possible Hypotheses References Bibliography Index