Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning

Description

Provides new interpretations and applications of Wittgenstein's philosophy in relation to fundamental issues in contemporary theoretical debates. Back Cover Copyright Title Contents Contributors Preface Acknowledgements 1 Anatomy of a Muddle: Wittgenstein and Philosophy 2 Explaining What We Mean 3 Objectivity 4 The Methodological Significance of Intuitions in Philosophy 1 Sosa and Bealer on Intuitions and Their Philosophical Significance 2 Critical Examination of the Notions of Intuition and Intuitions 2.1 The Capacity or Competence of Intuition 2.2 Particular Intuitions Including Philosophical Ones 3 The Methodological Significance of Intuitions 5 Wittgenstein on ‘Seeing Meanings’ i Various Uses of ‘See’ Wittgenstein’s Two Uses of ‘See’ ‘Seeing Shapes and Colours’ and ‘Seeing Things’ ii Looking at the World and Looking at Pictures Looking at the World Looking at Pictures iii Seeing Meanings iv Concluding Remarks 6 Bringing the Phenomenal World into View Introduction: Travis’s “Fundamental Question of Perception” and the Repression of the Phenomenal World Travis’s Answer to His “Fundamental” Question The Difficulty Posed by Wittgensteinian Aspects to Travis’s Account of Perception Aspects and Concepts Aspects as Perceived Internal Relations Concluding Remarks 7 First Steps and Conceptual Creativity Introduction 1 First Steps 1.1 The Fly and the Fly-Bottle 1.2 The First Step 1.3 ‘Now I Understand!’ 1.4 Aspect Change 2 Conceptual Creativity 2.1 Conceptual Spaces 2.2 Transformational Creativity 2.3 ‘Eureka!’ 2.4 Conceptual Change 3 Frege’s First Step 3.1 Wittgenstein and the Fregean Fly-Bottle 3.2 Frege’s Use of Function–Argument Analysis 3.3 ‘Concepts Are Functions!’ 3.4 Reconceiving Concepts 4 Wittgenstein’s Conceptual Creativity 4.1 Connective Creativity 4.2 Therapeutic Analysis 4.3 ‘That’s Exactly How I Meant It!’ 4.4 Changing Our Ways of Looking at Things 8 Wittgenstein and Analytic Revisionism I Introduction II Early Wittgenstein vs. Analytic Revisionism III Later Wittgenstein vs. Analytic Revisionism 9 Demystifying Meaning in Horwich and Wittgenstein 1 Horwich’s Reductionist Reading 2 Demystification in Philosophical Investigations §§185–242 3 The Shopkeeper and the Builders 4 Meaning, Truth, and Deflationism 5 Meaning and Dispositions 6 Concluding Remarks 10 What Is Meaning? A Wittgensteinian Answer to an Un-Wittgensteinian Question 1 A Theory of Meaning? 2 ‘What Is . . . ?’-Questions 3 Eliminativism about ‘Meaning’ 4 Meaning, Use, and Rules 5 Verificationism 6 Conceptual Role Semantics and Inferentialism 7 Function, Role, and Combinatorial Possibilities 8 Form-of-Life Holism 9 Speech Act Potential 10 Meaning, Explanation, and Understanding 11 Connective Analysis 12 Correctness, Truth, and Meaning 11 Meaning, Use, and Supervenience 1 Wittgenstein’s Anti-Reductionism 2 Supervenience 3 Supervenience and Dispositional Properties 4 Intentional Ghosts and Semantic Magic 5 Conclusion 12 Some Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy I The Exam: Socrates or Wittgenstein? II A Time When Every Philosophy Had a Socratic Aspect III Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein’sConception of Philosophy Appendix i - The Preliminary Exam Appendix ii - The Exam Proper Appendix iii - The Extra Credit Portion of the Exam Appendix iv - Answers to Exam Questions (with References) The Preliminary Exam The Exam Proper The Extra Credit Portion of the Exam References Works by or Originating from Wittgenstein with Abbreviations Other Works Index