In Defense of the Human Being: Foundational Questions of an Embodied Anthropology

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With the progress of artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the lifeworld, and the reduction of the mind to neuronal processes, the human being increasingly appears to be just a product of data and algorithms. That is, we conceive ourselves "in the image of our machines", and conversely, we elevate our machines and our brains to new subjects. At the same time, demands for an enhancement of human nature culminate in transhumanist visions of taking human evolution to a new stage. Against this self-reification of the human being, this book defends a humanism of embodiment: our corporeality, vitality, embodied freedom are the foundations of a self-determined existence, which uses these new technologies only as a means, instead of letting them rule us. In Defence of the Human Being offers an array of interventions directed against a reductionist naturalism or transhumanism in various areas of science and society. As alternative it offers an embodied and enactive account of the human person: we are neither pure minds nor brains, but primarily embodied, living beings in relation with others. Fuchs applied this concept to issues such as artificial intelligence, transhumanism and enhancement, virtual reality, neuroscience, embodied freedom, psychiatry, and finally to the accelerating dynamics of current society which lead to an increasing disembodiment of our everyday conduct of life. Cutting across neuroscience, philosophy, and psychiatry, this important new book applies cutting-edge concepts of embodiment and enactivism to the current scientific, technological and cultural tendencies that will crucially influence our society's development in the 21st century. cover In Defense of the Human Being Copyright Contents Abbreviations Introduction: A Humanism of Embodiment Acknowledgments References A. Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, Virtuality 1 Human and Artificial Intelligence: A Clarification Introduction: The World of Data The Digitization of the World Subjectivity and Its Simulation Persons are Not Programs Programs are Not Persons Robots, Androids, and Artificial Life (AL) Conclusion: Simulation and Original References 2 Beyond the Human? A Critique of Transhumanism Introduction: Between Naturalism and Culturalism The Idea of Perfectibility Can Human Nature be Improved? Cognitive Skills Happiness and Morality Aging and Death The Contradictions of Posthumanism Mind Uploading or Transfer of Consciousness Critique of Functionalism Critique of Neuro-​Reductionism Transhumanism as Neo-​Gnosticism Conclusion References 3 The Virtual Other: Empathy in the Age of Virtuality Introduction Empathy and Virtual Reality Primary, Implicit, or Intercorporeal Empathy Extended, Explicit or Imaginative Empathy Fictional Empathy Interim Summary Virtualization in the Present Phantomization Disembodied Communication Summary and Conclusion References B. Brain, Person, and Reality 4 Person and Brain: Against Cerebrocentrism Introduction Critique of the Cerebral Subject Subjectivity and Intentionality Embodiment Interpersonality Critique of Localizationism Critique of Neuroimaging Holism of Consciousness Personhood as Embodied Subjectivity Brain, Body, and Environment Brain Transplantation Conclusion References 5 Embodied Freedom: A Libertarian Position Introduction Can Brains make Decisions? Freedom as a Personal Ability Embodied Freedom External Objections The Compatibilist Counter Position Immanent Objections Conclusion References 6 Brain World or Life World? Critique of Neuroconstructivism Introduction Bodily Being-​in-​the-​World: The Coextension of Lived Body  and Physical Body The Locus of Pain Conclusion: Life-​World and Neuroscience References 7 Perception and Reality: Sketch of an Interactive Realism Introduction Perception as Interaction The Objectifying Power of Perception The Implicit Intersubjectivity of Perception Genesis of Intersubjective Perception Subjectivation of Perception in Schizophrenia Summary References C. Psychiatry and Society 8 Psychiatry between Psyche and Brain Introduction Reductionist Assumptions and their Verification Psychiatry as Relational Medicine: An Integrative Concept Conclusion References 9 Embodiment and Personal Identity in Dementia Introduction Personal Identity Body Memory Dementia and Personal Identity Dementia as a Loss of Reflexivity and Meta-​Perspective Body Memory in Dementia Relational versus Embodied View of the Person in Dementia Conclusion References 10 The Cyclical Time of the Body and the Linear Time of Modernity Introduction The Processes of Life and their Cyclical Time The Cyclical Structure of Body Memory Cyclical and Linear Time Individual and Collective Formation of the Linear Order of Time Conflicts between Cyclical and Linear Orders of Time Conclusion References Text References (English papers) Index