ENGLISH

Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility

By Robert Powell

Book information

Year
2008
ISBN
052106399X, 9780521063999, 0521375274, 9780521375276, 9780511551598
LCC
U162.6 .P69 1990
Open Library ID
OL2197721M
Language
english
Format
DJVU
Filesize
1 MB (1476657 bytes)
Edition
1
Pages
240\238
Time added
2011-06-04 13:46:07

Description

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

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