Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy

Description

This volume comprises nine lively and insightful essays by leading scholars on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work. The essays are written from a range of perspectives and do not belong to any one exegetical school; they approach Wittgenstein's work directly, seeking to understand it in its own terms and by reference to the context in which it was produced. The contributors cover a wide range of aspects of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but three central themes emerge: the relationship between Wittgenstein's account of representation and Russell's theories of judgment; the role of objects in the tractarian system; and Wittgenstein's philosophical method. Collectively, the essays demonstrate how progress in the understanding of Wittgenstein's work is not to be made by focusing on overarching, ideological issues, but by paying close attention to his engagement with specific philosophical problems. Table of Contents Contributors Introduction 1. Russell, Wittgenstein, and Synthesis in Thought • Colin Johnston 2. Early Wittgenstein on Judgement • Peter W. Hanks 3. The Tractatus and the Unity of the Proposition • Stewart Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic 4. Simple Objects: Complex Questions • Hans Sluga 5. Reference, Simplicity, and Necessary Existence in the Tractatus • José L. Zalabardo 6. What Can You Do with the General Propositional Form? • Cora Diamond 7. Russell’s Merit • Michael Kremer 8. Naturalism and ‘Turning our Examination Round’ • Marie McGinn 9. Two Cheers for the ‘New’ Wittgenstein? • Brian McGuinness Index