A Conceptual Investigation of Justice

Description

Conceptual analysis has fallen out of favor in political philosophy. The influence of figures like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin has led political philosophy to focus on questions about what should be done, and to ignore questions about the usage of words. In this book, Kyle Johannsen calls for renewed attention to the manner in which the word ‘justice’ is and should be used. Focusing on the late work of G.A. Cohen, Johannsen argues that debates over both the content and scope of egalitarian justice are, to a large extent, really just conceptual. Whereas some philosophers have been using the term ‘justice’ to refer to one among a plurality of values, others have been using it to refer to institutional rightness. Though the latter use of ‘justice’ is presently more dominant, he argues that much is to be gained from thinking of justice as one value among many. Doing so sheds light on the nature of both democracy and legitimacy, and, paradoxically, makes better sense of the idea that justice is ‘the first virtue of institutions’. Cover Title Copyright Contents Acknowledgments 1 Introduction 2 Fairness, Efficiency, and Value Theory 1 Introduction 2 Fairness and Efficiency 3 Theorizing Values (a) Internal and External Intuitive Judgments (b) Are Internality and Externality Post-Theoretical? 3 Defeasible Luck Equality 1 Introduction 2 Luck Egalitarianism: For and Against 3 A Defense of Defeasible Luck Egalitarian Justice; a Rejection of All-Things-Considered Luck Egalitarian Justice (a) The Appeal of Luck Egalitarianism: One-Thing-Considered, not All-Things-Considered (b) Counter-Intuitive Implications (c) An Implausible Conception of Freewill (d) Expressing Respect (e) Distributive Equality vs. Social Equality 4 Alternative Defenses of Luck Egalitarianism 5 The Practical Significance of Defeasible Luck Equality 6 Conclusion 4 Cohen’s Equivocal Attack on Rawls’s Basic Structure Restriction 1 Introduction 2 Scope and Status in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls 3 Demandingness, Subjective Welfare, and Cohen’s Personal Prerogative 4 Clarity and Fairness 5 Causing Justice 6 Regulatory Principles for the Personal Context 7 Conclusion 5 Narrow Justice 1 Introduction 2 Narrow Justice: Simple or Complex? 3 Cohen vs. Rawls on the Concept of Justice: A Merely Verbal Dispute? 4 Fairness and Legitimacy (a) The Problem of Arbitrariness (b) The Role of Reasonableness in Specifying a Fair Contract Situation (c) The Role of Substantive Fairness in Specifying a Fair Contract Situation 5 Conclusion 6 Fairness and Democratic Legitimacy 1 Introduction 2 Democracy and Reasonable Disagreement 3 Theorizing Democracy 4 Replies to Criticisms 5 Conclusion 7 Conclusion 1 Summary 2 Methodological Implications Index