Aristotle and the Ethics of Difference, Friendship, and Equality: The Plurality of Rule

Description

Connecting several strands of Aristotle’s thought, Zoli Filotas sheds light on one of the axioms of Aristotle’s ethics and political philosophy – that every community has a ruler – and demonstrates its relevance to his ideas on personal relationships. Aristotle and the Ethics of Difference, Friendship, and Equality reveals a pluralistic theory of rule in Aristotle’s thought, tracing it through his corpus and situating it in a discussion among such figures as Gorgias, Xenophon, and Plato. Considering the similarities and differences among various forms of rule, Filotas shows that for Aristotle even virtuous friends must exercise a version of rule akin to that of slaveholders. He also explores why Aristotle distinguishes the hierarchical rule over women from both the mastery of slaves and the political rule exercised by free and equal citizens. In doing so, he argues that natural and social differences among human beings play a complex, and troubling, role in Aristotle’s reasoning. Illuminating and thought-provoking, this book reveals Aristotle's ambivalence about political relations and the equal treatment they involve and offers an engaging inquiry into how he understood the common structures of human relationships. Half Title Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Contents Acknowledgments Note on the Texts and Translations Introduction I. Prelude: Socrates and Lysis II. Aristotle’s Theory of Rule Rule Pluralism Politics I.5 1254a26–33 Equality and Political Rule Rule as a Genus Species of Rule What Kind of Rule Is Best? III. Overview of the Argument IV. Navigating the Aristotelian Corpus Practical Philosophy, Not Science of Nature Argumentative Method V. The Contemporary Significance of Aristotle’s Theory of Rule Chapter 1: The Problem of Slavery and Persuasion in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BCE I. Rule Monism II. The Admonishment Claim III. Slavery and Violence, Freedom and Persuasion IV. Lysias: Logoi and Rule by the Truth V. Gorgias: Persuasion as Force VI. Plato: Logos Good and Bad VII. Plato: Mixing Compulsion with Persuasion VIII. Xenophon’s Theory of Rule Rule or Be Ruled Rule Monism Redux: The Royal Science Natural Slavery and Violence IX. Conclusion Chapter 2: Interpersonal Causation and the Generic Definition of Rule I. Practical Truth and the πίστεις II. Relationships between Souls in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics III. Ruling Decision Architectonic Crafts Virtue and Goals IV. Being Ruled V. Thinking for Someone Else Chapter 3: Kinds of Community, Kinds of Rule I. Nicomachean Ethics VIII.9–IX.3: Asymmetrical Friendship II. The Constitutional Analogy III. Kinds of Community, Kinds of Friendship IV. Communities and Power Structures V. Does Friendship always Involve Rule? An Impersonal Ruler? A Community of Self-Rulers? VI. Kinds of Rule Husbands, Wives, and Aristocratic Rule Fathers, Sons, and Kingly Rule Brothers, Political Rule, and Democratic Rule VII. Conclusion Chapter 4: Political Rule, Equality, and Equalization I. Protreptic Uses of Political Rule II. Political Rule Revisited III. Equality of Value IV. Equality and Equalization Proportional Equality Arithmetic Equality Reciprocal Equality Equalization Isonomia? Chapter 5: Political Rule and the Good I. What Communities Should Be Ruled Politically? II. Similarity, Difference, Pretence, and Imitation III. Equal Enough for Politics IV. Sameness, Difference, and Phronêsis V. Ruling, Holding Office, and Controlling the City VI. Politics and Choosing the Bad Conclusion I. Review of the Argument II. Liberalism and the Motley Reception of Aristotle’s Theory of Rule Notes Introduction Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Conclusion Bibliography General Index Index Locorum