Problems in Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates

Description

Problems in Epistemology and Metaphysics takes a pro and con approach to two central philosophical topics. Each chapter begins with a question: Can We Have Knowledge? How are Beliefs Justified? What is the mind? Contemporary philosophers with opposing viewpoints are then paired together to argue their position and raise problems with conflicting standpoints. Alongside an up-to-date introduction to a core philosophical stance, each contributor provides a critical response to their opponent and clear explanation of their view. Discussion questions are included at the end of each chapter to guide further discussion. With chapters covering core questions surrounding religious beliefs, scientific knowledge, truth, being and reality, this is a comprehensive introduction to debates lying at the heart of what we know, how we know it and the nature of the world we live in. Title Page Copyright Page Contents Contributors Acknowledgments Introduction What Philosophy Is All About The Approach of This Series Online Resources The Philosopher’s Toolkit Notes Part 1: Problems in Epistemology Introduction to Part One Skepticism The Structure of Justification: Foundationalism versus Coherentism Internalism versus Externalism Religious Beliefs and Evidence Scientific Realism versus Nonrealism The Scope of Scientific Explanations Note Chapter 1: Can We Have Knowledge? We Can Know A Short Account of Knowledge The Regress Argument and Its Failures Cartesian Skepticism and Its Failures Conclusion Notes We Can’t Know Cartesian Skepticism The Principles of Cartesian Epistemology Problems with Fallibilism Skepticism and Ordinary Language The Closure-Based Skeptical Argument The Pragmatic Explanation of False Knowledge Attributions The Utility of Skepticism Notes Responses Response to Huemer Huemer’s Response to Cartesian Skepticism Other Dogmatist Responses Notes Response to Lammenranta The Present Dispute Is Semantic How to Judge Semantic Disputes An Anti-skeptic’s Semantic Theory Skepticism Has No Practical Benefit Note Questions for Reflection Chapter 2: How Are Beliefs Justified? Beliefs Can Be Justified by Experience Preliminary Clarifications On Behalf of Foundationalism Davidson on Experiential Foundationalism The Sellarsian Dilemma Conclusion Notes Beliefs Are Justified by Coherence Intuitive Support for Coherentism The Nature of Coherence The Structure of Justification Two Related Arguments for Coherentism Conclusion Notes Responses Response to Howard-Snyder How Should We Understand Coherentism and Foundationalism? Howard-Snyder’s Support for Foundationalism The Problem of Arbitrariness The Problem of Experience Conclusion Note Response to McCain and Poston Two Problems More Problems for EC Note Questions for Reflection Chapter 3: Must the Grounds of Knowledge Be Accessible to the Knower? The Grounds of Knowledge Must Be Accessible Knowledge and Justified True Belief Internalism Defending Internalism Conclusion Notes The Grounds of Knowledge Need Not Be Accessible Ancient Intimations of Modern Epistemic Internalism Introducing Epistemic Externalism An Internalist Objection to Externalism An Externalist Objection to Internalism An Improved Epistemic Internalism? Externalism Refined Notes Responses Response to Hasan Hasan’s Evil Demon Case Hasan’s Fairy Case Response to Hetherington The Apparent Internalist’s Dilemma Responding to the Dilemma Notes Questions for Reflection Chapter 4: Do Religious Beliefs Require Evidence? Religious Beliefs Require Evidence Evidentialism: A Sketch of a Version Application to Religious Belief Conclusion Religious Beliefs Do Not Require Evidence Evidentialism Responding to Evidentialism Conclusion Notes Responses Response to Dougherty Is Evidentialism the Right Theory of Justified Belief? Are Religious Beliefs No Different from Moral and Logical Beliefs? Do Seemings Justify? Response to Senor The Person in the Pew Evidence and the New Testament Notes Questions for Reflection Chapter 5: Can Science Discover the Truth about Reality? Science Discovers the Truth about Reality The Positive Case for Realism The Negative Case for Realism Notes Science Does Not Discover the Truth about Reality The Fallacy of Appealing to Consequences Prediction, Reality, Observability, and Discovery The Parable of the Alien Artifact A Brief Conclusion Notes Responses Response to Psillos The Semantic Thesis The “No Miracles” Argument and “Approximate Truth” Notes Response to Rowbottom No Scientific Progress? What about Observables? Aren’t Theories Confirmable? What’s So Special about the Unobservable? Notes Questions for Reflection Chapter 6: Are Scientific Explanations Limited to Natural Causes? Scientific Explanations Are Limited to Natural Causes Theological Reasons for Methodological Naturalism Methodological Reasons for Methodological Naturalism God and Scientific Inquiry Notes Scientific Explanations Are Not Limited to Natural Causes Whence Methodological Naturalism? Naturalism-of-the-Gaps and the Ends of Scientific Rationality Conclusion: The Larger Toolbox Vindicated Notes Responses Response to Bishop What Is Methodological Naturalism? Bishop’s Straw Man ID Theory Methodological Naturalism versus Uniformitarianism A Theological Justification for Methodological Naturalism? Conclusion Notes Response to Gordon A Lesson in Fallacies Misreading History Naturalism-of-the-Gaps? Notes Questions for Reflection Essay Suggestions For Further Reading On Epistemology—Skepticism, Internal-Externalism, Foundationalism-Coherentism On Religious Knowledge On Philosophy of Science—Realism-Nonrealism, Methodological Naturalism Part 2: Problems in Metaphysics Introduction to Part Two The Problem of Universals The Mind-Body Problem Free Will and Determinism The Existence of God Note Chapter 7: Are There Universals? There Are Universals The Problem of Universals Ostrich Nominalism Resemblance Nominalism Trope Nominalism Other Kinds of Universals Notes There Are No Universals How Many Things Are There? Classification and Existence One over Many Semantics Bradley’s Regress Conclusion Notes Responses Response to Gould Not a Real Problem? How Is Resemblance Possible? How Many Entities? Response to Imaguire Classification and Existence One over Many Russell’s Paradox and Bradley’s Regress Notes Questions for Reflection Chapter 8: What Is the Mind? The Mind Is Material What Is Materialism? Two Common Reactions What about Our Minds? Evidence That the Mind Is Material Notes The Mind Is Immaterial What Is Material or Physical? So, Who and What Are You? The Mind Is Immaterial Notes Responses Response to Melnyk The Knowledge Argument Again The Weakness of Materialism Notes Response to Taliaferro We Know Our Own Mental States Why the Knowledge Argument Fails Notes Questions for Reflection Chapter 9: Is Free Will Compatible with Determinism? Freedom Is Not Compatible with Determinism Moral Responsibility Freedom and Responsibility Determinism Incompatibilism An Objection Conclusion Notes Freedom Is Compatible with Determinism What Do We Mean by Free Will and Determinism? What Is Not Required for Moral Responsibility What Is Required for Moral Responsibility Conclusion Notes Responses Response to Franklin The Failure of the Consequence Argument Libertarianism and Moral Responsibility Notes Response to Cowan Morally Responsible Action Free Will Note Questions for Reflection Chapter 10: Does God Exist? God Exists A Truth-Seeker’s Tool: The Best Explanation Explaining Existence Explaining Much More Faith That Sees Notes God Does Not Exist Background Versions of the Argument from Evil Skeptical Theism Can Theists Turn the Argument on Its Head? Arguments for a Lesser God? Responses Response to Rasmussen Is the God Hypothesis the Best Explanation of the Existence and Nature of Our Universe? What More Can the God Hypothesis Explain? Notes Response to Russell How Can There Be Bad? How Skeptical Can We Be? Theodicy Notes Questions for Reflection Essay Suggestions For Further Reading On Metaphysics—Universals On the Mind-Body Problem On Free Will and Determism On the Existence of God Index