Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics: Exercises in Analytic Ontology

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What is an object? How do we look at them? Why do they matter? This collection presents a lively, timely discussion of natural and artifactual objects, considering the relationship between them from a range of philosophical perspectives, including the philosophy of biology, the metaphysics of space and the philosophy of perception. Beginning from the starting point that natural objects are bona fide, endowed with some natural border between themselves and everything else, while artifactual objects depend on the observation of tacit conventions and may include the ordinary objects of everyday life, this volume explores, contextualises and interrogates objects. Contributors discuss a variety of objects including physical, scientific and mental ones, as well as things that appear to question the limits of object-hood, including holes, Quinean 'posits' and language. The very first collection to address this growing topic within analytic philosophy, Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics represents a highly original work, showcasing some of the most important and influential philosophers working in Europe today. Title Page Copyright Page Contents Carving Nature at the Joints Finding the joints Social joints Notes Part 1: Does Nature Carve Itself? Chapter 1: Mental Acts, Externalism and Fiat Objects: An Ockhamist Solution Human knowledge Notes References Chapter 2: Is the World Really a World of Objects? A Note on Quinean Ontology Premise Quine’s cognitive-linguistic theses: Objects as Posits How posits arise in language Posits as psychological and biological devices Ontology, realism and indispensability Notes References Chapter 3: Spatial Fictionalism. A Solution to the Grounding Problem Introduction No Co-occupation Law Against the NCL The grounding problem Prominent solutions to the grounding problem Spatial Fictionalism Solution Conclusion Notes References Chapter 4: Talking about Properties: A Couple of Doubts about Hofweber’s Internalist View Internal and external questions of existence The internalist view of talk about properties: The first doubt Nominalism about properties and conceptual idealism: The second doubt Concluding remarks Acknowledgements Notes References Part 2: Where Do Limits Lie? Chapter 5: The Eye of the Needle: Seeing Holes Immaterialism and indirect seeing Seeing holes Notes References Chapter 6: Bona Fideness of Material Entities and Their Boundaries Introduction Problems with bona fideness A new approach to bona fideness of material entities Conclusion Acknowledgements Notes References Chapter 7: A Conceptualist View in the Metaphysics of Species The species-as-individuals view The biological concept provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions The phylogenic concepts provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions A conceptualist model for the metaphysics of species Conclusion Notes References Part 3: Where Do Tools Come From? Chapter 8: Artifacts and Fiat Objects: Two Families Apart? Introduction Artifacts and fiat objects: A preliminary characterization Comparing artifacts and fiat objects Artifacts and fiat objects: A bottom–up strategy Benefits and costs of using functions for artifact and fiat object classification Conclusions Notes References Chapter 9: The Semantics of Artifactual Words Words as prototypical artifacts The nature of words Other artifacts and their nature Acknowledgements Notes References Chapter 10: Are Linguistic Objects Fiat or Bona Fide? An Ancient Proposal Preliminaries Expressed words: The Peripatetic theory A second Peripatetic view: Sounds are symbols of thoughts and not of things The proposition: Problems for the Aristotelian conception Conclusions Notes References Part 4: What Does Mind-Dependency Depend On? Chapter 11: Leibniz’s Principle and Psycho-Neural Identity Leibniz’s principle as an epistemic criterion of numerical difference Can Leibniz’s criterion be used as an argument against the identity theory? Why token identity and type identity are in the same boat Arguments for identity Conclusions Notes References Chapter 12: Do We Exist? Mereological Nihilism, Collective Thinking and Dualism Mereological nihilism Do I exist? The collective thinking question The challenge to be met – and a dualist-Buddhist suggestion Notes References Abstracts Carving Nature at the Joints Mental Acts, Externalism and Fiat Objects: An Ockhamist Solution Is the World Really a World of Objects? A Note on Quinean Ontology Spatial Fictionalism. A Solution to the Grounding Problem Talking about Properties: A Couple of Doubts on Hofweber’s Internalist View The Eye of the Needle: Seeing Holes Bona Fideness of Material Entities and Their Boundaries A Conceptualist View in the Metaphysics of Species Artifacts and Fiat Objects: Two Families Apart? The Semantics of Artifactual Words Are Linguistic Objects Fiat or Bona Fide? An Ancient Proposal Leibniz’s Principle and Psycho-Neural Identity Do We exist? Mereological Nihilism, Collective Thinking and Dualism Index of Names and Principal Subjects