The Other in Perception: A Phenomenological Account of Our Experience of Other Persons

Description

emonstrates the unique, pervasive, and overwhelmingly important role of other people within our lived experience. Drawing on the original phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Simone de Beauvoir, and John Russon, as well as recent research in child psychology, The Other in Perception argues for perception’s inherently existential significance: we always perceive a world and not just objective facts. The world is the rich domain of our personal and interpersonal lives, and central to this world is the role of other people. We are “paired” with others such that our perception is really the enactment of a coinhabiting of a shared world. These relations with others shape the very way in which we perceive our world. Susan Bredlau explores two uniquely formative domains in which our pairing relations with others are particularly critical: childhood development and sexuality. It is through formative childhood experience that the essential, background structures of our world are instituted, which has important consequences for our developed perceptual life. Sexuality is an analogous domain of formative intersubjective experience. Taken as a whole, Bredlau demonstrates the unique, pervasive, and overwhelmingly important role of other people within our lived experience. Susan Bredlau is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Emory University. About the Author Susan Bredlau is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Emory University. Tags: Philosophy, Ethics & Moral Philosophy, Movements, Phenomenology, Psychology, Interpersonal Relations Contents Acknowledgments A Note on Citations Introduction 1 Phenomenology Introduction Husserl and Intentionality Merleau-Ponty and Embodiment Russon and Polytemporality Conclusion 2 The Phenomenological Approach to the Experience of Others Introduction Husserl and the “Pairing” Relation Merleau-Ponty on the Perception of Others Russon and the Others within Our Own Bodies Conclusion 3 The Institution of Interpersonal Life Introduction Perceiving through Others: Neonate Imitation, Joint Attention, and Mutual Gaze Infant-Caregiver Play Periods as “Pairings” Caregiver “Availability” and the Impact of Pairing Relations on Infant Perception Pairing and Trust Russon on Pairing as the Institution of Personality Conclusion 4 Recognition and Sexuality Introduction Childhood Intimacy and Adult Intimacy Sexuality as a Bodily Intentionality Hegel on Recognizing Subjects as Subjects Sexuality as Embodied Recognition Sexuality and Interpersonal Vulnerability Sexuality and Freedom Conclusion Conclusion: The Concrete Ethics of Lived Experience Notes Bibliography Index