Laws of Nature

Description

This Element provides an opinionated introduction to the metaphysics of laws of nature. The first section distinguishes between scientific and philosophical questions about laws and describes some criteria for a philosophical account of laws. Subsequent sections explore the leading philosophical theories in detail, reviewing the most influential arguments in the literature. The final few sections assess the state of the field and suggest avenues for future research. Cover Title page Copyright page Laws of Nature Contents 1 Introduction 1.1 Scientific vs. Metaphysical Questions about Laws 1.2 Philosophical Method 1.3 Why Care? 2 Humeanism 2.1 The Humean Mosaic 2.2 The Naïve Regularity Theory 2.3 Extensional Problems for the Naïve Regularity Theory 2.4 The Humean Best Systems Account 2.5 Some Virtues of the Humean BSA 2.6 Extensional Problems for the BSA 2.7 A Puzzle Concerning the Language of Systematization 2.7.1 Solution 1: Naturalness Constraints on Best Systems 2.7.2 Solution 2: Pragmatic Constraints on Best Systems 2.8 Humeanism and Laws in the Special Sciences 2.9 Conclusion 3 Objections to Humeanism 3.1 Laws govern 3.2 Laws Support Counterfactuals 3.3 Laws Explain Regularities and/or Their Instances 3.4 Laws Support Induction 3.5 Conclusion 4 Non-Humean Theories of Laws 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Four Important Theories 4.2.1 Divine Voluntarism 4.2.2 Primitivism 4.2.3 DTA: External Relations between Universals 4.2.4 Dispositionalism 4.4 Conclusion 5 Conceptual Objections to Non-Humeanism 5.1 Modal Primitives are Unintelligible 5.2 The Inference Problem 5.3 One Last Conceptual Objection 5.4 Conclusion 6 Further Problems for Non-Humean Theories 6.1 Problems for Property-Based Theories of Laws 6.1.1 Functional Laws 6.1.2 Conservation Laws 6.1.3 Special Science Laws 6.1.4 Recap 6.2 Problems for Divine Voluntarism and Primitivism 6.3 Conclusion 7 The Explanatory Argument for Non-Humeanism 7.1 Introduction 7.2 A Toy Example 7.3 The Explanatory Argument 7.4 Two Explanatory Problems 7.5 Conclusion 8 Epistemological and Methodological Issues 8.1 Method in Metaphysics 8.2 Epistemological Objections to Non-Humeanism 8.2.1 A New Worry about Explanatory Arguments 8.2.2 A Further Layer of Underdetermination? 8.3 An Epistemological Objection to Humeanism 8.4 Conclusion 9 An Alternative to Humeanism and Non-Humeanism 9.1 Motivating Humeanism, or Something Else? 9.2 Minimalism about Laws 9.3 Lessons and Applications 9.4 Conclusion References Acknowledgments