Executive Secrecy and Democratic Politics: Arguments and Practices in the German Bundestag

Description

This book investigates the parliamentary negotiation of executive secrecy. Parliaments depend on information to fulfil their roles as the people’s representatives, legislators and overseers of the executive. However, there are examples of executive secrecy across all policy fields. How, then, do parliamentary actors try to reconcile secrecy and the normative demands of an open, democratic society? This volume analyses parliamentary arguments, conflicts and patterns of agreement around this topic in the case of Germany. Based on two case studies – intelligence agencies secrecy and Public Private Partnership secrecy – it argues that substantive justifications of secrecy focusing on necessity are highly contested. By contrast, procedural legitimation of secrecy, namely deciding about it democratically, is crucial. Still, there are inherent limits to the legitimation of executive secrecy. The book therefore underlines the fragility of secrecy’s legitimation, and its need for constant actualisation. Acknowledgements Contents Abbreviations List of Figures List of Tables 1 Introduction: Executive Secrecy and Democratic Politics References 2 Theorising and Studying Democratic Secrecy From Arcana Imperii to Publicity Substantive Legitimation of Executive Secrecy Quality of the Decision-Making Process Quality of Outcome: Effective and Efficient Decisions Third-Party Interests Procedural Legitimation of Executive Secrecy How to Study Secrecy? A Research Framework for Investigating Its Legitimation References 3 Legitimising Intelligence Agency Secrecy Substantive Legitimation: Controversies Concerning Secrecy’s Benefit for Security Security International Cooperation and Third-Party Interests Securing Separation of Powers: The Kernbereich Argument Patterns of Debating Secrecy Ideological Conflict Lines Conflict Lines Along Institutional Roles Legislation as Procedural Legitimation Secrecy Legislation as a Source of Legitimacy and Its Conditions Opposition Support for Legislation as a Source of Procedural Legitimation Parliamentary Scrutiny as Procedural Legitimation Access to Information Human Resources Sanctioning Power Opposition Rights Intelligence Secrecy—Between Substantive Contestation and Procedural Enclosure References 4 Legitimising Public–Private Partnerships Secrecy Economic Interests as Substantive Legitimation of PPP Secrecy Trade and Business Secrets Fiscal Interests of the State Kernbereich Secrecy Patterns of Debating Secrecy Ideological Conflict Lines Conflict Lines Along Institutional Roles Limited Procedural Legitimation Through Legislation Fragmented Parliamentary Scrutiny Public Private Partnership Secrecy—In Want of Procedural Enclosure References 5 Patterns and Limits of Legitimising Executive Secrecy Comparing Substantive Legitimation of Executive Secrecy General Patterns Partisan Conflicts Conflicts Based on Parliamentary Roles Missing Agreement on Substantive Legitimation A Matter of Democratic Practice–Procedural Legitimation of Executive Secrecy Legislation: Making Rules on Secrecy and Secret Action Parliamentary Scrutiny: Detecting Transgressions Why Procedural Legitimation Does Not Solve All Problems of Executive Secrecy—Structural Limits of Parliamentary Legitimation The Problem of Executive Compliance Reluctance to Legislate The Problem of Information Control The Paradox of Publicity as a Sanctioning Power Key Findings on Secrecy and Its Legitimation References 6 Avenues for Research and Political Practice Starting Points for Further Research International Comparison of Secrecy Cultures and Frameworks Comparison Across Multiple Policy Fields Day-to-Day Executive Practices Democratic Scrutiny Beyond Parliament Potential Consequences for Political Practice Setting Up Proxy-Monitoring Frameworks Solving the Third-Party Problem: Contractual Implications Democratic Discourse on Secrecy as Prerequisite of Legitimising Secrecy References Annexes Annex 1: List of Motions in the Intelligence Agencies Case Annex 2: Interview Guideline Interview Guideline Overview Example Guideline Annex 3: Use of Different Mechanisms of Parliamentary Scrutiny 1998–2013