Death is a Bugbear: Socratic ‘Epode’ and Epictetus' Philosophy of the Self

Description

Epictetus uses the words free and freedom more often than any other ancient Greek philosopher, and wrote the one complete treatise on freedom that has come down to us. This chapter discusses Epictetus' view of freedom in the light of some recent interpretations, focusing on his use of the word eleutheria, and in particular on his discourse On Freedom (Discourses 4.1). This discourse shows that Epictetus was aware that there was a problem of the relation between determinism and freedom, but he was not interested in facing it theoretically. Being concerned primarily with ethics, he lived his freedom in the context of Stoic providentialism, recognizing that moral character depends on man unconditionally, whereas things morally indifferent are administered by the will of god. For Epictetus, true freedom is not negative freedom consisting in the absence of determination, but the positive freedom of the virtuous man to do the right thing, the freedom learnt from his own Stoicism. This sense of freedom leads to a kind of quietism close to that of the early Wittgenstein, as gathered from some of his reflections. �Read more... Abstract: Epictetus uses the words free and freedom more often than any other ancient Greek philosopher, and wrote the one complete treatise on freedom that has come down to us. This chapter discusses Epictetus' view of freedom in the light of some recent interpretations, focusing on his use of the word eleutheria, and in particular on his discourse On Freedom (Discourses 4.1). This discourse shows that Epictetus was aware that there was a problem of the relation between determinism and freedom, but he was not interested in facing it theoretically. Being concerned primarily with ethics, he lived his freedom in the context of Stoic providentialism, recognizing that moral character depends on man unconditionally, whereas things morally indifferent are administered by the will of god. For Epictetus, true freedom is not negative freedom consisting in the absence of determination, but the positive freedom of the virtuous man to do the right thing, the freedom learnt from his own Stoicism. This sense of freedom leads to a kind of quietism close to that of the early Wittgenstein, as gathered from some of his reflections