The Impact Of Illegal Insider Trading In Dealer And Specialist Markets - Evidence From A Natural Experiment

Description

This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Financial Economics, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser. Description: We examine insider trading in specialist and dealer markets, using the trades of stock brokers who had advance copies of a stock analysis column in Business Week magazine. We find that increases in price and volume occur after informed trades. During informed trading, market makers decrease depth. Depth falls more on the NYSE and Amex than on the Nasdaq. Spreads increase on the NYSE and Amex, but not on the Nasdaq. We find none of these pre-release changes in a nontraded control sample of stocks mentioned in the column. Our results show that insider trading has a negative impact on market liquidity; depth is an important tool to manage asymmetric information risk; and specialist markets are better at detecting informed trades. Abstract......Page 1 1.Introduction......Page 2 2.Related literature......Page 5 3.Legal case and data......Page 8 Table 1......Page 9 Table 2......Page 10 4.Abnormal returns......Page 13 Table 3......Page 14 5.1.Buying interest and interval returns......Page 15 Table 4......Page 16 Table 5......Page 18 Table 6......Page 19 References......Page 24