Dreaming: A Conceptual Framework for Philosophy of Mind and Empirical Research (The MIT Press)

Description

A comprehensive proposal for a conceptual framework for describing conscious experience in dreams, integrating philosophy of mind, sleep and dream research, and interdisciplinary consciousness studies. Dreams, conceived as conscious experience or phenomenal states during sleep, offer an important contrast condition for theories of consciousness and the self. Yet, although there is a wealth of empirical research on sleep and dreaming, its potential contribution to consciousness research and philosophy of mind is largely overlooked. This might be due, in part, to a lack of conceptual clarity and an underlying disagreement about the nature of the phenomenon of dreaming itself. In Dreaming, Jennifer Windt lays the groundwork for solving this problem. She develops a conceptual framework describing not only what it means to say that dreams are conscious experiences but also how to locate dreams relative to such concepts as perception, hallucination, and imagination, as well as thinking, knowledge, belief, deception, and self-consciousness. Arguing that a conceptual framework must be not only conceptually sound but also phenomenologically plausible and carefully informed by neuroscientific research, Windt integrates her review of philosophical work on dreaming, both historical and contemporary, with a survey of the most important empirical findings. This allows her to work toward a systematic and comprehensive new theoretical understanding of dreaming informed by a critical reading of contemporary research findings. Windt's account demonstrates that a philosophical analysis of the concept of dreaming can provide an important enrichment and extension to the conceptual repertoire of discussions of consciousness and the self and raises new questions for future research. Contents Acknowledgments General Introduction: The Conceptualizatin Problem of Dreaming Methodology Overview of the Chapters 1 Dream Skepticism, Skepticism about Dreaming, and the Problem of Dream Experience 1.1 The Background Assumptions behind Cartesian Dream . . . 1.2 Norman Malcolm’s Denial of Dream Experience 1.3 In Defense of Dream Experience: Malcolm’s Critics 1.4 Taking Stock: Toward an Alternative Account of the Problem of . . . 1.5 Conclusions 2 A Short Introduction to Empirical Dream Research: History, Methodology. . . 2.1 Changing Conceptions of Sleep and Dreaming 2.2 The Refinement of Methods and Proliferation of Rival Theories 2.3 Conclusions 3 The Methodological Background Assumptions of Scientific Dream . . . 3.1 Studying Dreaming in the Sleep Laboratory: Polysomnograpy and Timed . . . 3.2 Studying Sleep without Studying Dreaming: Neuroimaging . . . 3.3 Studying Dreaming without Studying Sleep: Exclusively . . . 3.4 Studying Dreaming through Sleep Behavior I: Sleep Disorders 3.5 Studying Dreaming through Sleep Behavior II: Lucid Dreams 3.6 Studying Dreaming through Its Losses: Lesion Studies 3.7 Studying Dreaming without Studying Dream Reports? . . . 3.8 Conclusions 4 Antiskepticism about Dreaming and Dream Reporting: From Default . . . 4.1 Inference to the Best Explanation as a Response to the Skeptic 4.2 Inference to the Best Explanation at Work: Toward an . . . 4.3 Lessons from the Debate on Dream Color: From . . . 4.4 Transparency and Reportability Restricted: . . . 4.5 Antiskepticism about Dream Reporting and the Debate . . . 4.6 Conclusions 5 Dreaming as Quasi-Perceptual Experience: The Traditional View 5.1 The Philosophical Literature 5.2 The Empirical and Psycholog- ical Literature 5.3 Conclusions 6 Dreaming as Imaginative Experience: The Rival View 6.1 The Philosophical Literature 6.2 The Empirical and Psychological Literature 6.3 Conclusions 7 Are Dreams Subjective Experiences (I)? Phenomenal Selfhood and . . . 7.1 The Bodily Duplicate Hypothesis and the No-Body Hypothesis 7.2 A Review of Bodily Experiences in the Dream . . . 7.3 A Conceptual Framework for Describing Phenomenal . . . 7.4 Taking Stock: The Weak- . . . 7.5 Conclusions 8 Are Dreams Disembodied Experiences? The Role of the Body and of the . . . 8.1 The Functional-Disembodiment Hypothesis 8.2 The Bodily Sources of Dreaming 8.3 The Neuronal Basis of Bodily Experience in Dreams 8.4 Taking Stock: The Weak- . . . 8.5 Conclusions 9 Are Dreams Subjective Experiences (II)? The Phenomen- ology of . . . 9.1 The Doxastic-Duplicate Hypothesis and the No-Belief . . . 9.2 The Cogitative-Duplicate Hypothesis and the . . . 9.3 A Conceptual Framework for Describing the Cogitative . . . 9.4 The Neuronal Basis of the Cogitative Dream Self 9.5 Taking Stock (I): The Weak- . . . 9.6 Taking Stock (II): The Problem of Dream Belief Revisited . . . 9.7 Conclusions 10 Are Dreams Deceptive Exper- iences? Decep- tion, Delusion, and Insight 10.1 The Deception Hypothesis and the No-Deception Hypothesis 10.2 The Delusion Hypothesis and the Insight Hypothesis 10.3 A Conceptual Framework for Describing Different . . . 10.4 Taking Stock (I): Reassessing the Skeptical Threat 10.5 Taking Stock (II): Dreams, Delusions, and Insight 10.6 Conclusions 11 From Oneiragogia to Full-Fledged Dreaming: The Immersive- . . . 11.1 From the Phenomenal Core of Dreaming to the . . . 11.2 Oneiragogia: Sleep – Wake Transitions and the Gradual . . . 11.3 Objections to the Immersive- . . . 11.4 Conclusions 12 Relocating Dreams on the Conceptual Map: Consequences and Perspectives . . . 12.1 Dreams, Amodal Agent Models, and Illusory Self-Location 12.2 Immersive Virtual Reality, Substitutional Reference Frames, and . . . 12.3 Wandering Minds, Predictive Brains, and . . . 12.4 Reflections on the Functions of Dreaming 12.5 Conclusions Notes References Index