Game Theory: A Modeling Approach (Textbooks in Mathematics)

Description

Game Theory: A Modeling Approach quickly moves readers through the fundamental ideas of the subject to enable them to engage in creative modeling projects based on game theoretic concepts. The authors match conclusions to real-world scenarios and applications. The text engages students in active learning, group work, in-class discussions and interactive simulations. Each chapter provides foundation pieces or adds more features to help readers build game theoretic models. The chapters include definitions, concepts and illustrative examples. The text will engage and challenge both undergraduate and graduate students. Features: Enables readers to apply game theorty to real-world scenarios Chapters can be used for core course materials or independent stuides Exercises, included at the end of the chapters, follow the order of the sections in the text Select answers and solutions are found at the end of the book Solutions manual for instructors is available from the authors Game Theory Contents Preface Acknowledgments 1 Models and Games 1.1 Introduction To Modeling 1.2 Introduction To Game Theory 1.3 Examples Of Games 1.4 Rationality Assumption Exercises 2 Player Preferences 2.1 Ordinal Utilities 2.2 Von Neumannmorgenstern Utilities 2.3 Constructing Utilities 2.4 Determining Risk Exercises 3 Simultaneous Play 3.1 Strategic Games 3.2 Final Jeopardy 3.3 Mixed Strategies 3.4 Nonmatrix Models 3.5 Limitations Exercises 4 Bilateral Agreements 4.1 Negotiations 4.2 Bargaining In Strategic Games 4.3 Fairness Properties Exercises 5 Sequential Play 5.1 Sequential Games 5.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Combinatorial Games 5.4 Moral Hazard Exercises 6 Missing Information 6.1 Imperfect Information 6.2 Romans And Germans 6.3 Incomplete Information 6.4 Bargaining Games With Private Information 6.5 International Collaboration 6.6 Auctions Exercises 7 Repetitious Play 7.1 Repeated Social Dilemmas 7.2 Modeling Noise 7.3 Evolutionary Game Theory Exercises 8 Multilateral Agreements 8.1 Shapley Argument 8.2 Nucleolus Argument 8.3 Bargaining Argument 8.4 Voting Power Exercises 9 Resource Allocation 9.1 Resource Allocation Problem 9.2 Bargaining And Coalition Models 9.3 Complete And Incomplete Information Models 9.4 Concluding Remarks Appendix A Selected Answers Bibliography Index Exercises