The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties

Description

This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties – of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment. Various accounts of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction are analysed in detail, and it is argued that the most promising approach to defining this distinction is to consider extrinsic properties as a particular type of relational property. Moreover, it is shown that two key notions in the metaphysics of properties, the supervenience relation and the dispositional/categorical distinction, whose scope is usually restricted to intrinsic properties, can fruitfully be applied to extrinsic properties as well. Preface Part I - The Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction 1 Introduction: An Intuitive Definition 2 Ontological Background 2.1 Properties and Relations 2.2 Individuals 3 Defining Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 3.1 Early Accounts of the Distinction 3.2 Modal Accounts 3.2.1 Lewis’s Initial Account 3.2.2 Langton and Lewis’s Account 3.2.3 Problems Encountered by Langton and Lewis’s Account 3.2.3.1 The Problem of Border-Sensitive Properties 3.2.3.2 The Problem of Disjunctive Properties 3.2.4 Vallentyne’s Account 3.2.5 Yablo’s Account 3.3 Combinatorial Accounts 3.3.1 Weatherson’s Account 3.3.2 Denby’s Account 3.4 Relational Accounts 3.4.1 The Basic Idea 3.4.2 Francescotti’s Account 3.4.3 A Modified Relational Account 4 Haecceitistic Properties 5 General Features of the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction 5.1 A Local and a Global Version 5.2 Mere Cambridge Properties 6 Defining Intrinsic and Extrinsic Relations Part II - Extrinsic Properties in the Framework of Physicalism 1 Introduction: Extrinsic Properties and the Multi-Layered Picture of the World 2 Supervenience of Extrinsic Properties 2.1 The Standard Notions of Supervenience 2.1.1 The Notions of Weak, Strong and Global Supervenience 2.1.2 Problems Encountered by the Standard Notions 2.1.2.1 The Problem of Cross-World Variation 2.1.2.2 The Problem of Intra-World Variation 2.1.2.3 The Problem of Extrinsic Higher-Level Properties 2.2 Non-Standard Notions of Supervenience 2.2.1 A Combined Notion 2.2.2 Weak, Intermediate and Strong Global Supervenience 2.3 Notions of Supervenience Based on Criteria of Relevance 2.3.1 Regional Supervenience 2.3.2 Property-Dependent Supervenience 3 Extrinsic Dispositions 3.1 The Debate on Dispositions 3.2 Arguments for the Intrinsicness of Dispositions 3.2.1 Armstrong’s Argument 3.2.2 Lewis’s Argument 3.2.3 Molnar’s Argument 3.3 Examples of Extrinsic Dispositions 3.4 Implications Final Remarks Bibliography Index