The Debate on Probable Opinions in the Scholastic Tradition

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In 'The Debate on Probable Opinions in the Scholastic Tradition', Rudolf Schuessler portrays scholastic approaches to a qualified disagreement of opinions. The book outlines how scholastic regulations concerning the use of opinions changed in the early modern era, giving rise to an extensive debate on the moral and epistemological foundations of reasonable disagreements. The debate was fueled by probabilism and anti-probabilism in Catholic moral theology and thus also serves as a gateway to these doctrines. All developments are outlined in historical context, while special attention is paid to the evolution of scholastic notions of probability and their importance for the emergence of modern probability. Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Innovations in the Early Modern Era 2. Plurality and Pluralism 3. Modern Approaches to the ‘Use of Opinions’: Social Epistemology,Testimony, and Others 4. Sources, Genres, and Interpretations 5. Chapter Preview Chapter 1. Medieval Antecedents 1. Medieval Scholastic Attitudes to the Variety of Opinions 2. Knowledge, Faith/Conviction ( fides), and Opinion in the Middle Ages 3. Probability as Standard for the Acceptability of Opinions 3.1 The Endoxon and Probable Opinion 3.2 Both-Sided Probability and Greater or Smaller Probability 3.3 Endoxical Probability and Authority 4. ‘Medieval Tutiorism’ 5. A Medieval Pluralism of Opinions 6. Conclusion Chapter 2. The Road to Probabilism — A New Doctrine on the Use of Opinions 1. From the Late Fifteenth to the Late Sixteenth Century 1.1 Trends on Use of Opinions in Early Modern Scholastic Thought 1.2 Other Trends with a Possible Impact on Probability and the Use of Opinions 1.3 Melchor Cano (1509–1560) 2. Probabilism 2.1 Is Probabilism Irrational or Inconsistent? 2.2 Uses of Probabilism 2.3 Epistemological and Moral Justifications of Probabilism 3. Discussion and Conclusion Chapter 3. Probabilism and Anti-Probabilism — Interlocked Lifecycles 1. 1577–1620: The Rise of Probabilism 2. 1620–1656: Probabilism as Dominant Mainstream 2.1 The 1640s: First Stirrings of Opposition to Probabilism and Response of Probabilists 2.2 ‘Laxism’ and Its Critics 2.3 On the Widening of the Scholastic Pluralism of Opinions 3. 1656–1700: Probabilism Under Fire. The Rise of Anti-Probabilism. Probabilism’s Defenses. The Epistemological Debate Unfolds 3.1 Anti-Probabilism: Key Claims 3.2 Probabilists Respond: 1656–1678 3.3 Probabilism 1656–1678: Sympathy for Modern Science and a Focus on Epistemology 3.4 1670–1700: ‘Civil War’ among the Jesuits Chapter 4. The New Dual Concept of Probability and the Demise of the Endoxon 1. The New Dual Concept of Probability 2. Maryks’ Claim of the Jesuit Origins of Dual Probability 3. Ciceronian Influences? 4. The Heyday of the (Unrefined) Dual Concept of Probability 5. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Probability 6. Leaving Aristotle without Saying Goodbye 7. Conclusion Chapter 5. Selection Criteria, Common Opinion, and Ordinary Persons 1. Selection Criteria for Authors and Opinions 1.1 The ‘Checklists’ of Konrad Summenhart (c. 1450–1502) and Martín de Azpilcueta (1493–1586) 1.2 Juan Azor’s (1535–1603) List of Scholastic Classics 2. Sets of Criteria from the Seventeenth Century 3. Common Opinion 4. Ordinary Persons and Non-Experts (Illiterati, Idiotae) 4.1 Women 5. Conclusion Chapter 6. Stand-Alone Authority and Majorities as Guideto Truth 1. Aquinas on Following One’s Teacher 2. Stand-Alone Authority in Probabilism 3. Anti-Probabilism: Opponents of Stand-Alone Authority 4. Numerical Thresholds of Extrinsic Probability 5. The Early Modern Philosophical Avant-Garde on Stand-Alone Authority 6. Epistemic Majoritarianism: Scholastic and Modern 6.1 Digression: Epistemic Democracy 7. Conclusion Chapter 7. Ancient and Modern Opinions — Which to Prefer? 1. Antiqui and Moderni in Scholastic Thought 2. Probabilism as Vector of Modernization 3. Caramuel and the Moderns 4. Anti-Probabilist Backlash 5. The querelle des anciens et des modernes: Parallels and Influence 6. Conclusion Chapter 8. The Great Debate on Probable Opinions(1656–1700) 1. New Conceptions of Probable Opinion and Probability 2. Kinds of Probability 2.1 Speculative and Practical Probability 2.2 Probability in Itself (quoad se) and for Us (quoad nos); Subjective and Objective Probability 2.3 Probability and Probabilism: Direct or Indirect/Reflexive 3. Key Assumptions of Anti-Probabilism 3.1 Bianchi, Mercori, Fagnani (and Some Non-scholastics) 3.2 Miguel de Elizalde (1617–1678) 3.3 Tirso Gonzalez de Santalla (1624–1705) 4. Conclusion Chapter 9. Delimiting the Space of the Reasonable — The Challenge of Probable Probability and Slight Probability 1. The Debate on Slight and Probable Probability 2. An Argument of Infinite Regress 3. The Spectre of Skepticism 4. Caramuel and Probable Probability 5. Conclusion Chapter 10. Believing What We Want — A New Doxastic Voluntarism 1. Scholastic Doxastic Voluntarism before the Seventeenth Century 1.1 Digression: The Modern Debate on Doxastic Voluntarism 2. Probabilist Doxastic Voluntarism after Bianchi 3. Mature Probabilist Doxastic Voluntarism: Anthony Terill’s Approach 3.1 Question 8: Assent to Equally Probable Propositions 3.2 Question 9: Assent to a Less Probable Opinion 3.3 Question 10: The Reasonableness of Assent to a Less Probable Opinion 4. Terill Further Considered 5. Conclusion Chapter 11. Assessing Probabilism — Between Liberty and Tutelage 1. Modern Views on Probabilism: Liberty, Tutelage, Extrinsicism 2. The Perspective of Normative Theory 2.1 Probabilism as a Liberty - Favoring Doctrine 2.2 The Duties of a Confessor: Absolution against His Own Moral Views 2.3 Extrinsicism 3. The Perspective of Practice and the Historical Perspective 3.1 Obedience to Orders and to Authorities 3.2 The Spectre of the Counter-Reformation 3.3 Probabilism and the Language of Liberty 4. Conclusion Chapter 12. The Scholastic Background of Modern Probability 1. Gambling Problems and Interpretations of Probability 1.1 The Art of Gambling and the ‘Problem of Points’ 1.2 Modern Interpretations of Probability 2. Caramuel’s Contribution 3. A New Scholastic Frequentism 4. Scholastics on Aleatory Contracts and Expected Value 5. Other Developments 6. Why Did a Mathematical Theory of Probability Emerge in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century? References Index